Wilson Harris' Radical Imagination by Duane Edwards
Caribbean Journal of Philosophy Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012 (Published July 2015) 
 
Wilson Harris’ Radical Imagination 
by 
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Abstract:  
This essay represents an exposition of Wilson Harris’ concept of the radical imagination and its 
application to the affairs of contemporary Caribbean. It starts by comparing and contrasting Harris’ 
conceptualisation of the imagination with other well-known ‘philosophers of the imagination’, namely, 
Kant, Levinas and Castoriadis. It then sheds further light on Harris radical imagination by comparing it to 
the folk imaginary of Caribbean people, specifically the Amerindian and Afro-Caribbean imaginary. It 
then offers examples of how this radical and creative imagination can be employed to achieve the long 
deferred freedom, equality and justice, the ideals upon which an independent Caribbean was founded. 
 
The Radical Imagination and the Kantian Synthesis 
One of the singular connecting vectors in all of Wilson Harris’ work is the concept of the ‘Womb of 
Space’: Harris’ metaphor for the cross-cultural imagination. In spite of the fact that this concept permeates 
all or most of Harris’ writings, the abstruse nature of his writings combined with the numinous diction 
renders these much important and significantly relevant concepts inaccessible to the people for whom 
they are most intended, those are the West Indian masses, the people who, in my analysis are best 
positioned, owing to our relatively low level of incorporation into the Baudrillardian simulated world, to 
deploy the resources of the creative imagination and charter a path of collective human self-actualisation 
envisioned by Harris in his ‘Palace of the Peacock’ and subsequent works. 
To begin the clarification of Harris’ radical imagination, it might be necessary to draw upon the work of 
many philosophers, psychoanalysts, historians, sociologists, and cultural critics. The work of Levinas 
might be a good starting point. There is nothing arbitrary about this choice; this connection has already 
been made by Hena Maes-Jelinek (1991). For Levinas, anarchy points to a pre-ontological reality, ‘a 
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radical ante’ that precedes time, rule and principle.  This radical ‘ante’ is revealed in the very etymology 
of the word, ‘anarchy’.  Anarchy is composed of two Latin word, ‘an’ and ‘arche’. ‘An is the Latinised 
form of the English words ‘before’ and ‘Against’. The word ‘arche’, on the other hand, is the Latinised 
form of the English word ‘rule’ or ‘principles’. The composite word then means ‘before rule or principles’ 
or ‘against rule or principles’. Levinas’ ‘anarchy is an an-arche that signals a deep formerly…Such 
anarchy overturns the order and structure of philosophy by exposing the gaps, tears, and wounds that 
reason is supposed to cover, mend, and heal (Taylor 1987, 192). Levinas anarchy is an-arche (before 
time), every other thing is secondary reality, ‘never primary, always secondary’. Similar to Levinas’ 
anarchy, Harris’ ‘womb of space’ points to a pre-ontological reality that both predates and escapes 
absolute re-presentation and can only be accessed in traces and partial images (Taylor 1987, 193;  Henry 
2000, 95). Even the most cursory reading of Harris would reveal that all of his work represents a 
sustained and consistent onslaught against hardened rules and principles whether they manifest 
themselves in literary and philosophical texts, or in reality. Not only does he protest against these 
hardened rules but he makes it clear while doing so that’s these hardened rules prevent access to a reality 
which predates (an) these rules (arche) themselves. 
What do I mean by the rule or principles being predated by the ‘womb of space’ or the radical 
imagination? Zizek’s critique of Kant’s transcendental imagination is very instructive in clarifying this 
issue. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, distinguished between the synthetic activities of the 
understanding (that is, the tendency of the faculty of  understanding to group related things together in 
order to arrive at a better understanding) and the synthesis of the manifold sensuous intuitions. This 
second synthesis, according to Kant, does not involve the activity of the understanding; on the contrary, it 
is the work of the transcendental imagination. According to Kant, both the rule-governed understanding 
and the creative imagination are into the business of synthesis. “The first thing which must be given to 
us”, Kant asserts, “in order for us to achieve a priori cognition of all objects is the diversity of the pure 
intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives us yet no 
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cognition. The concept which gives unity to this pure synthesis…furnishes the third requisite for the 
cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding” (Kant, 1988). If we accept 
Kant’s theory of the imagination, then Harris, in trying to escape the rule-governed ( hence restrictive) 
activity of the understanding by taking solace in the imagination becomes by so doing a no less victim of 
the synthesising, totalising tendencies of the imagination, because according to Kant, it is the imagination 
which furnishes the understanding with the first synthesis. In Kantian epistemology, the imagination 
pushes in the same direction of the understanding. In his critique of Kant, Zizek, supporting Heidegger, 
argued quite persuasively that Kant recoiled from the radical conception of the imagination by reducing 
the imagination to a mediating force between pure sensuous manifold of intuition and the cognitive 
synthetic activity of the understanding (Zizek 1999). In his obsession to synthesise, Kant passes over the 
negative disruptive, anarchistic power of the imagination emphasised by Hegel in his concept, ‘Night of 
the World’ and Harris in his ‘Womb of Space’. “What Kant neglects is the fact that the primordial form of 
imagination is the exact opposite of this synthetic activity” (Zizek 1999). Zizek agreed that there is an 
inherent antagonism between the imagination and understanding. Though Zizek has come quite further 
than Kant, he is also guilty of recoiling from the radical conception of the imagination and its 
dismembering task. Though he accepts that quite contrary to Kant, the imagination not only comes 
‘before’ and ‘against’ (an) the rule-governed (arche) of the understanding, but that it also pushes in the 
opposite direction, Zizek had a less than radical understanding of this dismembering task. For Zizek, the 
pre-synthetic imagination is a destructive power that undermines every organic unity. ‘Imagination 
enables us to treat as effectively existing something that is merely a component of a living whole.’ Zizek’s 
shortcoming is his failure to recognise what Harris has recognised. For Zizek, the disruptive power of the 
imagination separates phenomena that organically belong together. By so thinking, he was unable to break 
out of his Hegelian, Marxist epistemology. He failed to see, as Harris has conceived that far from ripping 
apart what is meant to be organically connected, what the imagination does is to break down that which 
has established its own particular existence as self-sustaining and isolated. For Harris, the real wholeness 
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is not the wholeness that has been structured by and out of the particular but the insoluble wholeness that 
escapes structuration (Harris 1999, 252). Just as the negative, disruptive, anarchist tendency of the 
imagination is seen as violent it responds to the violence of the understanding, that is, the violence 
marked by the repression of the infinite possibility of the free subject by giving transcendental status to 
one structural possibility among many.                                    
 
Castoriadis’ Radical Imaginary 
Against the reductionism of Marx and Freud, Castoriadis arrived at a position similar to Wilson Harris 
viz-a-viz the role of the creative imagination. While contesting the Marxist and Freudian positions which 
reduced the symbolic (represented by institutions such as the polity, law, family, religion, etc , in Marx’ 
case and Phantasy in Freud’s case) to the real (economy in the case of Marx and the body in the case of 
Freud) Castoriadis distinguished between the actual imaginary and the radical or creative imaginary, 
giving the actual imaginary a secondary role in the psyche while preserving a primal role for the radical 
and creative imaginary. The actual imaginary, he posits, expresses itself via the symbolic, the radical 
imaginary, on the other hand, serves as the inexhaustible source of meaning for both the symbolic and the 
actual imaginary. To be radical, Marx said somewhere, is to go to the root of things. And, it is in this sense 
that the epithet ‘radical’ is prepended to the imagination which serves as the source of phantasy and the 
symbolic. To use an image very much over-used in psychoanalysis, the relationship between the two 
imaginaries and the symbolic is highlighted by the primal phantasy of the mother’s breast experienced by 
the child when he goes hungry for the first time. Here Castoriadis disagrees with Freud. This phantasy 
represents not the primary but the secondary phantasy. Freud confounded the two imaginaries, thereby 
grounding both on the real experience of bodily want and lack.  Castoriadis argues, however, that the 
‘internal need’ experienced for the first time has disrupted a state of equilibrium that existed before (an) 
the need and to which the psyche via phantasy wishes to return. It is this prior, always already existing 
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state of equilibrium, this ‘monadic core of the primal subject’ that Castoriadis refers to as the radical 
imaginary. While the secondary phantasy activated by the child’s hunger (bodily need) depends on that 
need or lack for its being, and is thereby constituted by this need, the primal phantasy is not constituted by 
this bodily need but is itself a ‘constituting phantasy-phantasmatization’.  
“The ‘discovery’ of the breast as absent…is made only in relation to and on the basis of the requirement 
that nothing is to be absent, nothing is to be lacking; it is only in this way that something can be posited as 
‘missing’ as not being where it ought to be. This necessarily refers back to an originary mode of being of 
the psyche as representing-representation to which nothing is ‘missing’, to an aim-intention tendency of 
figuring presentify (itself) in and through representation which is always realized.” (Whitebook 1989, 225 
- 244). 
What Castoriadis means is that when we dream (or phantasies or imagine) far more than merely serving 
as a means of wish-fulfilment, far more than tricking the psyche into thinking that it is achieving a real 
desire, the dream endeavours to recreate a primal balance or equilibrium that came before but which was 
interrupted by the process of socialisation and acculturation. This primal balance or unity is a state of 
being which we have forever lost and towards which we constantly tend. Unfortunately, however, as soon 
as we experience a break from this state of being, we are incapable of retrieving or restoring this state. We 
can only experience traces of it in our everyday life. Our mode of being, our ontological reality, therefore, 
is one characterised by a primal lost – a lack which we spend our entire life trying to make up for but the 
fulfilment of which keeps evading us. The modern consumer society preys upon this primal lack by 
promising fulfilment in consumer products and services. Harris’ own treatment of the human state is 
congruent with Castoriadis’. This is evident by the following excerpt, 
‘To find ourselves within a medium of broken wholeness is to respond to infinite variables and factors in 
a quest for impossible fulfilment which we entertain nevertheless as a true goal though we resist imposing 
it on ourselves as an accomplished fact’  (Harris 1999, 235). 
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It is in this sense that Castoriadis converges with Harris for whom dreams are the eruption of the 
unconscious in the life of the conscious being. 
Although there is much convergence between Castoriadis and Harris’ theories of the radical imagination, 
there are also some important divergences. For one, what Castoriadis refers to as the monadic core, Harris 
refers to as the womb of space. Though these concepts refer roughly to the same phenomenon, the 
semantic difference reveals a more fundamental difference between the two images. At Castoriadis’ 
monadic core, there is pure unity and symmetry, while in Harris’ womb of space the very opposite 
obtains: pure diversity and asymmetry. While for Castoriadis the overriding psychic condition of the 
subject is a longing for a lost balance and symmetry in a world characterised by infinite multiplicities and 
asymmetries, for Harris who recognised this lust for symmetry as a defining human condition, explains 
this lust as an attempt by the ego to close itself off from the symbolic, asymmetric input of the radical 
imagination. One must not, however, equate Harris’ diversity with chaos and discord. There is always an 
underlying unity in which ‘the fluids of the animal soul mirrored in and interwoven with the ecology of 
oceans  and rivers and lakes upon which the individual floats at times like a bubble’ (Harris 1999, 228). 
Harris womb of space is filled with layers each of which represents some quantum reality, each layer of 
reality being connected with each other layer of reality. This interconnectedness is brought out explicitly 
in his last work, Jonestown. 
Castoriadis’ conception of the monadic core of the primal subject forces us to revisit the earlier assertion 
by Zizek that the radical imagination breaks apart that which is meant to be organically connected. For 
Castoriadis, at the primal level of the psyche there is nothing but absolute unity. There exists none of the 
dichotomies and differences we experience in everyday life, such as object/subject, internal/external, 
male/female, etc. What exist is absolute sameness and undifferentiated identity. There is no lack or need 
at this level because the monadic core is absolutely self-subsistent and self-referential. The problem of 
need and lack arises after the initial break when the pure subjectivity for the first time experiences an 
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‘other’ external to itself. This other and othering (the process by which this other manifests itself) become 
explicit when the subject experiences hunger and realises that both the object of that hunger and the 
process through which that hunger is satisfied are no longer part of itself but is totally detached. This 
othering signifies a violent break, a splitting that keeps recurring exponentially. This splitting results in a 
plethora of objects which are all parts of an initial state of wholeness. Violence occurs when these by no 
means self-subsistent entities act as if they are self-subsistent by building stone walls around their own 
existence, by building grand theories and institutions in economics and politics which fosters the illusion 
of attainment of that lost unity. Though, as accounted earlier, that lost state is irretrievable, traces of it are 
accessible if we keep ourselves open so that it can manifest itself through our subconscious and 
consciousness. Violence occurs when we close ourselves to this potential eruption. It is then that the 
radical imagination responds with greater violence (negation) against our self-enclosed egos. 
Another demonstration of Harris’ radical imagination is evident in his critique of Jung. In an essay titled 
“Merlin and Parsifal: Adversarial Twin”, Harris explicated Jung’s recognition that in order to address the 
chasm between Merlin and Parsifal (the prisoner of tradition and the slave of modernity) a new 
conceptual language is needed. Jung, however, expressed misgivings about the emergence of such 
language on account of the fact that it requires the mediation by ‘sense organs’. Harris’ position is that 
Jung was thinking radically in that he recognised the need for a new conceptual language; he recoiled, 
however, from the radical implication and possibility of his own thinking because he failed to appreciate 
the fact that such language can emerge without the mediation of sense organs. Harris continued Jung’s 
radical journey by insisting that such language can emerge solely from the pure, creative imagination, 
directly from the womb of cultural space without the mediation of sense organs. 
There are two radical implications of Harris’ position. The first is that such language already exists before 
(an) time (arche̅) within the cultural womb of space and awaits our subscription. The other implication is 
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that such language can be the accessed by pure intuition unmediated by the instrumentality of sense 
organs.  
Two concepts Harris uses to demonstrate the possibility of functioning faculties without the 
instrumentality of the sense organs are the dead-seeing eye  and the living blind eye. While the latter 
exists on the “level of conscious linear history, the ‘curious stone’ upon which he stands, the unchanging, 
uniform reality of colonial conquest”, the former exists on the level of “mythic history, the blind dreaming 
recall of the unconscious myth of El Dorado” (Wilson-Tagoe 1998, 110). 
Harris’ image of the dead seeing eye and the living blind eye have both predecessors and successors in the 
realm of the philosophies of the imagination. Aren’t Plato’s cave allegory and Baudrillard’s differentiation 
between the real and the simulation speak to the same reality? Don’t both speak to the gullibility of the 
sense organs – confusing the real and it’s appearances in Plato’s cave or the simulation in Baudrillard’s 
case and vice versa? Don’t our senses become often guilty of mistaking the shadows for the substances? 
Moreover, if Baudrillard’s consistent assertion that the modern (or post-modern) reality is one 
characterised by the decaying of the real and the triumph of self-referential simulation, then Harris is 
timely not only in stressing the possibility but also the necessity of a language unmediated by sense 
organs. If what we see with our eyes represents a pure simulacrum, then our access to the fundamental 
reality cannot be mediated by the said faculty which proves it is vulnerable to misrepresentation of reality. 
On the contrary, this clearly demonstrates the need for the employment of faculties beyond the ones we 
are accustomed to in our everyday attempts to grasp reality. Isn’t this also what Sylvia Wynter advocates 
when she calls for a dislocation of the founding epistemes of Western discourses? 
This need has been thematised quite explicitly in the post-colonial discourses of Said and Bhabha, both of 
whom addressed the question of the ability of the subaltern to speak. For Harris and Wynter, however, it is 
not just about the ability of the subaltern to speak but also about what language the subaltern should speak 
in. How could the subaltern speak when even language and its epistemic categories have been colonised? 
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Would her speech be anything other than the mimicry of the hegemonic other? When the post-colonial 
political leaders protested against the scourge of colonial administration, did they not employ the same 
epistemic categories handed down to them by the colonial powers? What then was (and is) the results? 
The result was the internalisation, rather than the excision, of the colonial other, the submission of the 
post-colonised masses under the same excesses they experienced under the colonial rulers, an infinite 
rehearsal of the coloniality of power. 
“While ordinary language intensifies differences and binaries, spiritual language blends opposites and 
animate the inanimate. Indeed, the loss of speech ushers in a world where everything speaks, sings, and 
listens to the undying bone-flute music of the soul” (Gana 2001, 153 -170). 
The Radical Imagination and the Folk Imaginary 
George Mentore (2010) gave us a wonderful demonstration of this imagination at work in Amerindian 
political anthropology. According to Mentore, the Amerindians have a wonderful and fascinating 
understanding of power that could be very instructive in understanding and responding to the exercise of 
power in the post-colonial Caribbean. This understanding of power is revealed in a tale by the Cariban-
speaking Waiwai of Southern Guyana. The narrative entails a jaguar in pursuit of a human quarry. ‘The 
jaguar stalks its prey along a thick forest trail.’ The human becomes conscious of being stalked by the 
predator and its predatory intent. Having no weapon and no immediately conceivable way of escaping 
from the pursuit of the Jaguar, the human quarry is forced to draw upon the resources of the creative 
imagination in order to stave off the predatory pursuer. This is accomplished by simply throwing in the 
path of the predator an Amerindian riddle basket, a product of the Waiwai imagination. The design of the 
basket presents an enigma. It is clearly a basket with an interior. The enigma, however, is that the entrance 
to the interior is not readily visible. ‘The enigmatic wave of the basket’, Mentore relates, ‘serves as a 
source of fun, the joy in a game that produces a puzzle whose broken code opens the only way into the 
basket.’ This puzzle serves to neutralise the predatory instincts of the jaguar while at the same time 
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activating its desire to play. Its desire to solve the very complex riddle of the Waiwai basket, totally takes 
its attention from its prey allowing the prey the opportunity of escape. This imaginative response to power 
is by no means limited to the Amerindian imaginary; it is also revealed in the folk imaginary of Guyanese 
people which is very much influenced by African ancestors. The story of ‘Old Higue’ gave us a strikingly 
similar approach to, and understanding of, power revealed in the Amerindian narrative. According to 
Guyanese folk stories, the Ol’ Higue is a blood sucking being (usually an old woman) that morphs from a 
human form into a ball of fire. It pursues its victims in the dark of the night when they are asleep and are 
obviously in a vulnerable state. As in the American folklore of the vampire, it sucks the blood of its 
victims to satisfaction. Unlike the American counterpart, however, the victim is not usually infected after, 
hence is able to serve again as a potential victim. The Guyanese folk imaginary produces a number of 
ways to neutralise the potency and effectiveness of the power of this predator, the most striking of which 
is placing a pile of rice grains somewhere near its intended victim. The ol’ Higue curse dictates that 
whenever it encounters such a pile it must count each grain one by one with its bare hands. In the event 
that one of the grains should slip through its fingers, it must start the counting again from the very 
beginning. With a very large pile of rice this becomes an impossible task. Whenever the ol’ Higue 
encounters such a pile, it is compelled to count the grains until day clean at which time it is caught by the 
inhabitants of the house who make use of its vulnerable state and capture and beat it to death. What is it 
that is revealed in these two folklores? It is not only that all power is ineffectual as asserted by Wilson 
Harris in a lecture delivered to students of the University of Guyana, but that all power is vulnerable. 
There is no such thing as total power. Power is always vulnerable to the stratagems of a creative and 
radical imagination. Allow me to repeat an often told joke demonstrative of the vulnerability of power. It 
is often joked that in his residence on the East Coast of Demerara, Forbes Burnham was wont to playfully 
exercise and demonstrate his power among the security persons at his residence. There was this one 
instance whereby one of the security officials was caught picking a fruit from one of the trees in the yard 
and was ordered immediately to put it back on.  The outcome then was in the Kabaka’s (as he is also 
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known) favour as he watched the security trying all kinds of MacGyver tactics to stick the fruit back on 
the stem from which he picked it. There was this other instance, however, where the outcome was 
definitely in the favour of the security who drew upon the resources of the creative imagination to 
outsmart the Kabaka. There was this ripe, nice looking papaya hanging from one of the trees in the yard. 
The security persons knew very well that picking and eating that one was out the question because the 
Kabaka had noticed it and had intended to pick it and give it to his wife the following morning. During 
the course of the night, the security guards plotted to use the papaya without actually picking it. They 
massaged the papaya until it got very soft, after which they punched a fine hole in it and sucked out all the 
juice from the fruit. When they finished, they blew it up so that it wouldn't look saggy and scotched taped 
the hole. In the morning when the Kabaka went into the yard, the papaya was the first thing he 
approached with the intent of picking it and presenting it to his wife. As he grabbed the papaya to pick it, 
the force with which he grabbed deflated the papaya. He was immediately angered, but when he 
investigated and learned what really transpired, he gave his usually sardonic grin and exclaimed, with 
paternal like satisfaction, ‘Ha ha ha! my boys! my boys!’ Here was a man who was at the height of his 
power- who achieved such heights by tactfully out-manoeuvring all his opponents, imagine then such a 
man being out-manoeuvred by the lowliest of his citizens, his residence security. These three stories 
present us with wonderful demonstration of the folk imagination at work. They also point to the 
possibility of confronting power from within its vulnerability, from within its interstices. 
The Radical Imagination, Perversion, and Hysteria 
More than protesting against power utilising the same prepossessions of power which only that leads to 
tinkering with the current system what we need according to Harris is a radical negation. Harris, himself, 
however, refused to give any details about this radical negation. The logical outcome of his writings, 
however, is that there is a need for a total dissolution of the current structure and system of things, even if 
only because it is the hardened form of the European ego which keeps consolidating its own self-
sufficiency at the expense of the human life and natural environment which served and continues to serve 
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as its base. ‘In the death of politics’, he stated, ‘(however ritually or conventionally preserved in the 
panoply of the state) may gestate a seed of revisionary, epic theatre rooted in complex changes in human 
and animal nature…’ (Harris 1996, 8).  Apart from a few partial images here and there, Harris recoiled 
from giving any details about the form this radical negation and dissolution should take because being the 
ideal typical hysteric, he was avowedly unaware of what is the object of our jouissance. What do I mean 
by the term hysteric? This is brought to light by Zizek in his ‘Ticklish Subject’. Zizek differentiates 
between the hysteric and the pervert. The pervert is always certain about what brings enjoyment and 
satisfaction; s/he is always goal-oriented. The hysteric on the other hand lives in perpetual uncertainty 
(Zizek 1999, 248). It is this uncertainty, however, which keeps him/her open to the unconscious and 
makes him/her much more subversive to the hegemonic order than the pervert is. Let’s take a recent 
example to demonstrate the subversive power of the hysteric attitude as opposed to the attitude of the 
pervert. The mass protest in Brazil in June 2013 was reportedly triggered by the attempt by the authorities 
to raise transportation cost against the backdrop of millions of dollars being spent to host the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup. The then President, Dilma Rousseff, an avowed leftist, expressed solidarity with the 
protesters. She later intervened and brokered a rescinding of the decision to raise the transportation cost. 
In spite of this act of solidarity by the President, the protesters continued their protest eventually 
broadening their claims to include more far-reaching demands that go to the very heart of the survival of 
the system as such. This is a wonderful show of hysteria by the Brazilian masses and a very troublesome 
situation for any system of hegemony. The perverts, being sure of what they wanted, would have been 
easily appeased by the decision to postpone or cancel the decision to raise the fares and would have 
discontinued the protest thereby making it easy for the system. The hysterics on the other hand, being 
unsure of what it is that truly satisfies them keep on demanding. The infinite demanding (to use a concept 
which has become popular by the anarchist philosopher Simon Critchley) of the hysterics is far more 
subversive than the certainty of the perverts. Harris’ hysteria is by no means unfounded – the post-
colonial political experience vindicates this attitude. Harris himself refers to this experience as an 
Caribbean Journal of Philosophy Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012 (Published July 2015) 
 
‘accumulation of crises’. He was amazed at how the passionate anti-colonial rebel could change into the 
pitiless post-colonial authoritarian. ‘…an equation of pervasive irony in twentieth-century global politics, 
in inverted Latin America and Third World cultures which have wrested freedom from brutal empires they 
still emulate – is a measure of doomed symmetry or the death of the very freedom that appears to have 
been won’ (Harris 1999, 100). 
 
The opposing images of the pervert and the hysteric were given central treatment in Harris’ novel 
Jonestown. Jonah Jones (Jim Jones) and his followers were curtained of what they wanted. They wanted 
to experience that lost symmetry and balance which results from the broken wholeness expounded above. 
They were curtained that such symmetry lies in the promise and prescribed action of Jim Jones. At the 
very instance of death, Francisco Bone, the protagonist in Harris’ novel, started to hystericise. ‘I knew’, 
he declared, ‘ more searchingly and agonizingly than I had ever known before with the morsel on my 
tongue – the perversity of the harmony that he [Jim Jones] inspired in his people, the perversity of 
symmetry and dread closure …’(Harris 1996, 17). 
The post-colonial experience was that of the internalisation rather than the excision of the colonial logic. 
Our political leaders, the anti-colonial politicians and the colonized experienced a re-colonization by the 
local ruling elites. The problem of ‘ontic tautology’ made evident by post-colonial politicians points to a 
much deeper problem long thematised by Frantz Fanon. There are striking similarities between the 
ontogenetic realities of the post-slavery African subject and the phylogenetic realities of the post-colonial 
Caribbean state. As self-consciousness for the split subject in Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks was 
effectively a third person consciousness so to state and society were conceived in terms of the paradigm 
established by the European other. Just as the elements used by the post-slavery African subject had been 
provided not by ‘residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic, and 
visual character’ but by the other, so too, the trappings of statehood, community, economy and society 
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were not culled from the indigenous resources of the people occupying the Caribbean but from the 
dominant episteme (Fanon 1967). 
Adding to this miscarriage of the anticolonial promise, nay as a result of it, half a century after many 
Caribbean countries gain independence, the citizens are expressing the nostalgic wish that they were still 
governed by the former colonizers. Of course this nostalgic longing could be interpreted in the regular 
Foucauldian sense as the tendency of human kind to engage in nostalgic recollection of the good of the 
past while ignoring the evil side. This interpretation, however, misses the point. The feeling of betrayal 
and of deferred freedom among the West Indian masses is more reminiscent of Foucault’ recollection of 
his experience with the French education system whereby the secret knowledge promised to him was 
being continuously postponed. “In primary school he learned that the really important things would be 
revealed when he went to lycee; at the lycee he found that he would have to wait until the ‘class de philio’ 
(the final year). There he was told that the secret of secrets was indeed to be found in the study of 
philosophy, but that this would only be revealed at the university stage, that the best place to find it was at 
the Sorbonne and that the holy of holies was the Ecole Normale Superieure” (Sheridan 2013, 2-3). Similar 
to Foucault, the West Indian experience has been one of postponed promises. During the era of 
colonialism, we were promised that decolonisation would bring us freedom, dignity, equality and those 
other ideals we sought. After decolonisation, we were told that it would come with democracy. After 
democracy, we are now being told our sought after dream lies not in democracy, per se, but in the 
eventual economic growth which usually accompanies democracy. Now with America and Europe, the 
two bastions of democracy experiencing tremendous economic and growth problems while Asia, China 
especially which is by no means a democratic state, is developing rapidly, the promise is now being 
repackaged. Non-democratic forms of governments are at times necessary to propel growth. Therefore, 
we might have to sacrifice the political aspects of our ideals in order to accomplish their economic 
aspects. In this theatre of unfulfilled promises, the politicians seem to be playing the role of the hysteric 
while the blind populace, the perverts. The politicians are infinitely appealing and renewing their appeals 
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for the support of the masses in spite of numerous betrayals, abortions and deferrals of their promises 
while the masses expressing surety, or at least hope, by their electoral support that their ultimate 
enjoyment lies in the promised object. It is time that the masses switch the roles as demonstrated by the 
Brazilian protesters. Let the people make their demands and keep renewing their demands infinitely in an 
environment of creative application of the radical imagination. 
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